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AI systems have seen dramatic advancement in recent years, bringing many applications that pervade
our everyday life. However, we are still mostly seeing instances of narrow AI: many of these recent
developments are typically focused on a very limited set of competencies and goals, e.g., image
interpretation, natural language processing, classification, prediction, and many others. Moreover,
while these successes can be accredited to improved algorithms and techniques, they are also tightly
linked to the availability of huge datasets and computational power [21]. State-of-the-art AI still lacks
many capabilities that would naturally be included in a notion of (human) intelligence. Examples
of these capabilities are generalizability, adaptability, robustness, explainability, causal analysis,
abstraction, common sense reasoning, ethical reasoning [28], as well as a complex and seamless
integration of learning and reasoning supported by both implicit and explicit knowledge [20].
We argue that a better study of the mechanisms that allow humans to have these capabilities can help
us understand how to imbue AI systems with these competencies [5, 27]. We focus especially on
D. Kahneman’s theory of thinking fast and slow [16], and we propose a multi-agent AI architecture
(called SOFAI, for SlOw and Fast AI) where incoming problems are solved by either system 1 (or
"fast") agents (also called "solvers"), that react by exploiting only past experience, or by system 2 (or
"slow") agents, that are deliberately activated when there is the need to reason and search for optimal
solutions beyond what is expected from the system 1 agent. Both kinds of agents are supported by
a model of the world, containing domain knowledge about the environment, and a model of “self”,
containing information about past actions of the system and solvers’ skills. Given the need to choose
between these two kinds of solvers, a meta-cognitive agent is employed, performing introspection
and arbitration roles, and assessing the need to employ system 2 solvers by considering resource
constraints, abilities of the solvers, past experience, and expected reward for a correct solution of the
given problem [29, 30]. To do this balancing in a resource-conscious way, the meta-cognitive agent
includes two successive phases, the first one faster and more approximate, and the second one (if
needed) more careful and deliberate. Different approaches to the design of AI systems inspired by the
dual-system theory have also been published recently [2, 4, 7, 14, 15, 22, 24].
Many real-life settings present sequential decision problems. Depending on the availability of system 1
and/or system 2 solvers that can tackle single decisions or a sequence of them, the SOFAI architecture
employs the meta-cognitive agent at each decision, or only once for a whole sequence [3, 13, 24].
The first modality provides additional flexibility, since each call of the meta-cognitive module may
choose a different solver to make the next decision, while the second one allows to exploit additional
domain knowledge in the solvers.
We hope that the SOFAI architecture will support more flexibility, faster performance, and higher
decision quality than a single-modality system where meta-cognition is not employed, and/or where
there is no distinction between system 1 and system 2 agents. In this short paper, we describe the
overall architecture and the role of the meta-cognitive agent. We provide motivation for the adopted
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Figure 1: The SOFAI architecture, supporting system 1 / system 2 agents and meta-cognition.
decision problems such as (epistemic) planning and path finding in constrained environments, against
criteria intended to measure the quality of the decisions.
2 Thinking Fast and Slow in Humans
According to Kahneman’s theory, described in his book “Thinking, Fast and Slow" [16], human’s
decisions are supported and guided by the cooperation of two kinds of capabilities, that, for sake
of simplicity are called systems: system 1 provides tools for intuitive, imprecise, fast, and often
unconscious decisions (“thinking fast"), while system 2 handles more complex situations where
logical and rational thinking is needed to reach a complex decision (“thinking slow").
System 1 is guided mainly by intuition rather than deliberation. It gives fast answers to simple
questions. Such answers are sometimes wrong, mainly because of unconscious bias or because they
rely on heuristics or other short cuts [12], and usually do not have explanations. However, system 1 is
able to build models of the world that, although inaccurate and imprecise, can fill knowledge gaps
through causal inference, allowing us to respond reasonably to the many stimuli of our everyday life.
When the problem is too complex for system 1, system 2 kicks in and solves it with access to
additional computational resources, full attention, and sophisticated logical reasoning. A typical
example of a problem handled by system 2 is solving a complex arithmetic calculation, or a multi-
criteria optimization problem. To do this, humans need to be able to recognize that a problem goes
beyond a threshold of cognitive ease and therefore see the need to activate a more global and accurate
reasoning machinery [16]. Hence, introspection and meta-cognition is essential in this process.
When a problem is new and difficult to solve, it is handled by system 2 [18]. However, certain
problems over time pass on to system 1. The reason is that the procedures used by system 2 to find
solutions to such problems are used to accumulate experience that system 1 can later use with little
effort. Thus, over time, some problems, initially solvable only by resorting to system 2 reasoning
tools, can become manageable by system 1. A typical example is reading text in our own native
language. However, this does not happen with all tasks. An example of a problem that never passes to
system 1 is finding the correct solution to complex arithmetic questions.
3 Thinking Fast and Slow in AI: A Multi-agent Approach
As shown in Figure 1, we are working on a multi-agent architecture which is inspired by the "Thinking
Fast and Slow" theory of human decisions. In the SOFAI architectures, incoming problems/tasks are
initially handled by system 1 (S1) solvers that have the required skills to tackle them, analogous to
what is done by humans who unconsciously react to an external stimulus via their system 1 [16].
We assume S1 solvers act in constant time (that is, their running time is not a function of the size of
the input problem) by relying on the past experience of the system, which is maintained in the model
of self. The model of the world maintains the knowledge accumulated by the system over the external
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environment and the expected tasks, while the model of others maintains knowledge and beliefs over
other agents that may act in the same environment. The model updater agent acts in the background
to keep all models updated as new knowledge of the world, of other agents, or new decisions are
generated and evaluated.
Once an S1 solver has solved the problem (for sake of simplicity, let’s assume it is just one S1 solver),
the proposed solution and the associated confidence level are available to the meta-cognitive (MC)
module. At this point the MC agent starts its operations, with the task of choosing between adopting
the S1 solver’s solution or activating a system 2 (S2) solver. S2 agents use some form of reasoning
over the current problem and usually consume more resources (especially time) than S1 agents. Also,
they never work on a problem unless they are explicitly invoked by the MC module.
To make its decision, the MC agent assesses the current resource availability, the expected resource
consumption of the S2 solver, the expected reward for a correct solution and for each of the available
solvers, as well as the solution and confidence evaluations coming from the S1 solver. In order to not
waste resources at the meta-cognitive level, the MC agent includes two successive assessment phases,
the first one faster and more approximate, related to rapid unconscious assessment in humans [1, 26],
and the second one (to be used only if needed) more careful and resource-costly, analogous to the
conscious introspective process in humans [6]. The next section will provide more details about the
internal steps of the MC agent.
This is clearly an S1-by-default architecture, analogous to what happens in humans: whenever a new
problem is presented, an S1 solver with the necessary skills to solve the problem starts working on
it, generating a solution and a confidence level. The MC agent will then decide if there is the need
to activate an S2 solver. This allows for minimizing time to action (since S1 solvers act in constant
time) when there is no need for S2 processing. It also allows the MC agent to exploit the proposed
action and confidence of S1 when deciding whether to activate S2, which leads to more informed and
hopefully better decisions by MC.
Notice that we do not assume that S2 solvers are always better than S1 solvers, analogously to what
happens in humans [12]. Take for example complex arithmetic, which usually requires humans to
employ system 2, vs perception tasks, which are typically handled by our system 1. Similarly, in
the SOFAI architecture we allow for tasks that are better handled by S1 solvers, especially once the
system has acquired enough experience on those tasks.
4 The Role of Meta-cognition
Meta-cognition is generally understood as any cognitive process that is about some other cognitive
process [9]. We focus on the concept of meta-cognition as defined in [11, 23], that is, the set of
processes and mechanisms that could allow a computational system to both monitor and control its
own cognitive activities, processes, and structures. The goal of this form of control is to improve the
quality of the system’s decisions [9]. Among the existing computational models of meta-cognition
[8, 19, 25], we propose a centralized meta-cognitive module that exploits both internal and external
data, and arbitrates between S1 vs S2 solvers in the process of solving a single task. Notice however
that this arbitration is different than algorithm portfolio selection, which is successfully used for
many problems [17], because of the characterization of S1 and S2 solvers and the way the MC agent
controls them.
The MC module exploits information coming from two main sources:
1. The system’s internal models, which are periodically updated by the model updater agent:
• Model of self, which includes information about:
– Solvers’ past decisions in specific tasks.
– Resource consumption, e.g., memory and time of using solvers for specific tasks.
– Rewards of solvers’ decisions.
– Available system’s resources, e.g., memory, time.
– Expected reward for solving a task.
– Past resource consumption of the MC agent.
• Model of the world, which contains information about:
– Tasks, e.g., their input, goal, skills needed to solve it, etc.
– Decision environment.
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– Actions available to the solvers in each state and for each task.
• Model of others, which maintains knowledge and beliefs over other agents that may act in the
same decision environment.
2. S1 solver(s):
• Proposed decision for a task.
• Confidence in the proposed decision.
The first meta-cognitive phase (MC1) activates automatically as a new task arrives and a solution
for the problem is provided by an S1 solver. MC1 decides between accepting the solution proposed
by the S1 solver or activating the second meta-cognitive phase (MC2). MC1 makes sure that there
are enough resources, specifically time and memory, for completing both MC1 and MC2. If not,
MC1 adopts the S1 solver’s proposed solution. MC1 also compares the confidence provided by the
S1 solver with the expected reward for that task: if the confidence is high enough compared to the
expected reward, MC1 adopts the S1 solver’s solution. Otherwise, it activates the next assessment
phase (MC2) to make a more careful decision. The rationale for this phase of the decision process
is that we envision that often the system will adopt the solution proposed by the S1 solver, because
it is good enough given the expected reward for solving the task, or because there are not enough
resources to invoke more complex reasoning.
Contrarily to MC1, MC2 decides between accepting the solution proposed by the S1 solver or
activating an S2 solver to solve the task. To do this, MC2 evaluates the expected reward of using the
S2 solver in the current state to solve the given task, using information contained in the model of
self about past actions taken by this or other solvers to solve the same task, and the expected cost
of running this solver. MC2 then compares the expected reward for the S2 solver with the expected
reward of the action proposed by the S1 solver: if the expected additional reward of running the S2
solver, as compared to using the S1 solution, is greater than the expected cost of running the S2 solver,
then MC2 activates the S2 solver. Otherwise, it adopts the S1 solver’s solution.
To evaluate the expected reward of an action (here used to evaluate the S1 solver’s proposed action),
MC2 retrieves from the model of self the expected immediate and future reward for the action in the
current state (approximating the forward analysis to avoid a too costly computation), and combines
this information with the confidence the S1 solver has in the action. The rationale for the behavior of
MC2 is based on the design decision to avoid costly reasoning processes unless the additional cost
is compensated by an even greater additional expected value for the solution that the S2 solver will
identify for this task, analogous to what happens in humans [29].
For the sake of simplicity and lack of space, in this paper we did not consider the possibility of having
several S1 and/or S2 solvers for the same task, which would bring additional steps for both MC1
and MC2 to identify the most suitable solver. We also did not consider issues related to problem
similarity, and we assumed we have enough past experience about exactly the same problem to be
able to evaluate the expected reward and utility of solvers and actions. Finally, we did not discuss
how the expected value of an action and the associated confidence are combined: currently we are
working with a risk-adverse approach where these two quantities are multiplied, but we also plan to
explore other approaches.
5 Instances of the SOFAI Architecture
As mentioned, we believe that many real-life settings present sequential decision problems. Available
solvers could be able to choose one single decision of a whole sequence, or they may be able to build
a whole decision sequence (or everything in between). In the first scenario, the MC agent is used
to select the appropriate solver for each decision. In the second setting, the MC agent is used only
once, so its influence on the performance of the system and the quality of its decisions could be more
limited. However, usually the second setting occurs when we have solvers with a deep knowledge of
the decision domain, and can adapt their capabilities to the available resources and expected reward
for optimality and correctness of the decision sequences. We envision that these parameters and
domain knowledge can be exploited by the meta-cognitive agent both in the MC1 and the MC2 phase.
We are currently working on implementing two main instances of the SOFAI architecture, that cover
both extremes of this spectrum. In the first instance, we consider a decision environment in the form
of a constrained grid (where constraints are over states, moves, and state features), where solvers
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are only able to decide on the next move but entire trajectories (from an initial state to a goal state)
need to be built to solve the given task [13]. In the second instance, we consider epistemic planning
problems [10] where solvers are indeed planners, so they are able to build an entire plan and not just a
single step in the plan. In this case, the meta-cognitive module includes also steps regarding problem
and solver simplifications, as well as problem similarity assessment.
References
[1] R. Ackerman and V. A. Thompson. Meta-reasoning: Monitoring and control of thinking and
reasoning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 21(8):607–617, 2017.
[2] T. Anthony, Z. Tian, and D. Barber. Thinking fast and slow with deep learning and tree search.
In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, pages 5360–5370, 2017.
[3] A. Balakrishnan, D. Bouneffouf, N. Mattei, and F. Rossi. Incorporating behavioral constraints
in online AI systems. In Proceedings of the 33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(AAAI), 2019.
[4] Y. Bengio. The consciousness prior. arXiv preprint arXiv:1709.08568, 2017.
[5] G. Booch, F. Fabiano, L. Horesh, K. Kate, J. Lenchner, N. Linck, A. Loreggia, K. Murgesan,
N. Mattei, F. Rossi, and B. Srivastava. Thinking fast and slow in AI. In Proceedings of the
AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, volume 35, pages 15042–15046, 2021.
[6] P. Carruthers. Explicit nonconceptual metacognition. Philosophical Studies, 178(7):2337–2356,
2021.
[7] D. Chen, Y. Bai, W. Zhao, S. Ament, J. M. Gregoire, and C. P. Gomes. Deep reasoning networks:
Thinking fast and slow. arXiv preprint arXiv:1906.00855, 2019.
[8] M. T. Cox. Metacognition in computation: A selected research review. Artificial intelligence,
169(2):104–141, 2005.
[9] M. T. Cox and A. Raja. Metareasoning: Thinking about thinking. MIT Press, 2011.
[10] R. Fagin, Y. Moses, J. Y. Halpern, and M. Y. Vardi. Reasoning about knowledge. MIT press,
2003.
[11] J. H. Flavell. Metacognition and cognitive monitoring: A new area of cognitive–developmental
inquiry. American psychologist, 34(10):906, 1979.
[12] G. Gigerenzer and H. Brighton. Homo heuristicus: Why biased minds make better inferences.
Topics in Cognitive Science, 1(1):107–143, 2009.
[13] A. Glazier, A. Loreggia, N. Mattei, T. Rahgooy, F. Rossi, and K. B. Venable. Making human-
like trade-offs in constrained environments by learning from demonstrations. arXiv preprint
arXiv:2109.11018, 2021.
[14] G. Goel, N. Chen, and A. Wierman. Thinking fast and slow: Optimization decomposition across
timescales. In 2017 IEEE 56th Annual Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), pages
1291–1298. IEEE, 2017.
[15] A. Gulati, S. Soni, and S. Rao. Interleaving fast and slow decision making. arXiv preprint
arXiv:2010.16244, 2020.
[16] D. Kahneman. Thinking, Fast and Slow. Macmillan, 2011.
[17] P. Kerschke, H. H. Hoos, F. Neumann, and H. Trautmann. Automated algorithm selection:
Survey and perspectives. Evolutionary computation, 27(1):3–45, 2019.
[18] D. Kim, G. Y. Park, P. John, S. W. Lee, et al. Task complexity interacts with state-space uncer-
tainty in the arbitration between model-based and model-free learning. Nature communications,
10(1):1–14, 2019.
5
[19] J. D. Kralik, J. H. Lee, P. S. Rosenbloom, P. C. Jackson Jr, S. L. Epstein, O. J. Romero, R. Sanz,
O. Larue, H. R. Schmidtke, S. W. Lee, et al. Metacognition for a common model of cognition.
Procedia computer science, 145:730–739, 2018.
[20] M. L. Littman, I. Ajunwa, G. Berger, C. Boutilier, M. Currie, F. Doshi-Velez, G. Hadfield, M. C.
Horowitz, C. Isbell, H. Kitano, K. Levy, T. Lyons, M. Mitchell, J. Shah, S. Sloman, S. Vallor,
and T. Walsh. Gathering Strength, Gathering Storms: The One Hundred Year Study on Artificial
Intelligence (AI100) 2021 Study Panel Report. Stanford University, 2021.
[21] G. Marcus. The next decade in AI: Four steps towards robust artificial intelligence. arXiv
preprint arXiv:2002.06177, 2020.
[22] S. Mittal, A. Joshi, and T. Finin. Thinking, fast and slow: Combining vector spaces and
knowledge graphs. arXiv preprint arXiv:1708.03310, 2017.
[23] T. O. Nelson. Metamemory: A theoretical framework and new findings. In Psychology of
learning and motivation, volume 26, pages 125–173. Elsevier, 1990.
[24] R. Noothigattu, D. Bouneffouf, N. Mattei, R. Chandra, P. Madan, K. R. Varshney, M. Campbell,
M. Singh, and F. Rossi. Teaching AI agents ethical values using reinforcement learning and
policy orchestration. IBM J. Res. Dev., 63(4/5):2:1–2:9, 2019.
[25] I. Posner. Robots thinking fast and slow: On dual process theory and metacognition in embodied
AI. 2020.
[26] J. Proust. The philosophy of metacognition: Mental agency and self-awareness. OUP Oxford,
2013.
[27] F. Rossi and A. Loreggia. Preferences and ethical priorities: thinking fast and slow in AI. In
Proceedings of the 18th international conference on autonomous agents and multiagent systems,
pages 3–4, 2019.
[28] F. Rossi and N. Mattei. Building ethically bounded AI. In Proceedings of the 33rd AAAI
Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 2019.
[29] A. Shenhav, M. M. Botvinick, and J. D. Cohen. The expected value of control: an integrative
theory of anterior cingulate cortex function. Neuron, 79(2):217–240, 2013.
[30] V. A. Thompson, J. A. P. Turner, and G. Pennycook. Intuition, reason, and metacognition.
Cognitive psychology, 63(3):107–140, 2011.
6
